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An efﬁcient public health preparedness and response plan for infectious disease man-
agement is important in recent times when emerging and exotic diseases that hitherto
were not common have surfaced in countries with potential to spread outside borders.
Stewardship from a reference laboratory is important to take the lead for the laboratory
network, to proactively set up disease surveillance, provide referral diagnostic services,
on-going training and mentorship and to ensure coordination of an effective laboratory
response. In Malaysia, the Institute for Medical Research has provided the stewardship
for the Ministry of Health's laboratory network that comprises of hospital pathology,
public health and university laboratories. In this paper we share our experiences in recent
infectious disease outbreak investigations as a reference laboratory within the Ministry of
Health infectious disease surveillance network.The International Health Regulations was enforced in June
2007, emphasizing the obligation of State Parties to detect,
report, and respond to public health emergencies [1]. An
effective public health response requires a coordinated
laboratory response in the Ministry of Health (MOH) network
with credible laboratories capable of providing accurate and
reliable results in a timely manner to enable effective public
health measures to contain the spread of the outbreak. Most
countries have limited expertise and experience for detecting
exotic diseases that may be imported and depend on the
World Health Organization (WHO) and network laboratories
or the Centers for Disease Control, United States for technical
expertise, kits or controls and laboratory conﬁrmation.
Although the information and resources exchange during any
crisis is available through this network, this process takes
time. Time is a critical factor in the public health response for
preventing spread, surge and for efﬁcient containment of an
outbreak. Stewardship from a reference laboratory is important
to take the lead for the laboratory network, to provide referraldiagnostic services, on-going training and mentorship and to
ensure coordination of an effective laboratory response. Ebola
virus, Middle East respiratory syndrome corona virus (MERS-
CoV) and avian inﬂuenza A (H7N9) are examples of emerging
and reemerging viruses that have gripped the attention of many
nations worldwide. It is vital that countries should have the
ability to quickly identify potential cases as part of their
pandemic preparedness plan. In Malaysia, the Institute for
Medical Research (IMR) is the reference laboratory for
specialized diagnostics and infectious disease outbreak man-
agement. This paper highlights the stewardship role of IMR and
its important contribution to the national public health response
network.
MERS-CoV was identiﬁed in 2012 as the cause of severe
acute respiratory syndrome cases in Saudi Arabia. It was found
that all cases of MERS were linked to countries in or near the
Arabian Peninsula, or had travel history to those countries. On
April 16, 2014, MOH Malaysia reported the ﬁrst case of
laboratory-conﬁrmed MERS-CoV infection in a 54 year-old
man, who came back from performing pilgrimage in Saudi
Arabia. The patient who developed pneumonia with respiratory
distress, after returning to Malaysia on March 29, succumbed to
his illness three days after admission at a local hospital. Com-
bination of throat and nasal swabs sample taken from the patient
was sent to a State Hospital laboratory that has the capability toarticle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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MERS-CoV. The rRT-PCR screening and initial conﬁrmatory
assays were performed on April 14 at the Melaka Hospital and
both assays were positive for MERS-CoV. Since this is the ﬁrst
case that has ever yielded a positive result in Malaysia, a sample
was sent to the IMR, Kuala Lumpur which acts as the National
MERS-CoV Conﬁrmation Laboratory, for further investigations.
IMR was able to conclusively conﬁrm by DNA sequencing the
genes that code for the nucleocapsid and RNA-dependent RNA
polymerase proteins of the MERS-CoV. Based on partial
sequencing of these genes, it was revealed that the strain was
closely related to strains from Jeddah. However, following full
nucleocapsid gene sequencing the Malaysian case actually was
99.9% identical to the sequence derived from the Qatari and
Saudi Arabian camels and clustered together with human-
derived MERS-CoV sequences isolated from human cases in
2014, among them were those reported in Greece and USA [2].
H7N9 infections in humans were ﬁrst reported in China in
March 2013. In 2014, IMR also successfully conﬁrmed
Malaysia's ﬁrst inﬂuenza AH7N9 case outside Greater China
(including Hong Kong and Taiwan) on February 12 in a
Chinese tourist. The patient was a 67-year-old woman who
was previously treated by a general practitioner in China on
January 30, four days before travelling to Malaysia with
symptoms of fever, cough, fatigue and joint pain. She arrived
in Kuala Lumpur on February 4, and travelled to Sabah the
following day. On February 7, she was admitted to the
intensive care unit at Tuaran District Hospital for acute
respiratory distress. She was intubated and upon family
request was transferred to a private hospital in Kota Kinabalu.
On February 9, the ﬁrst respiratory sample was tested positive
for H7 by IMR and on February 11, H7N9 by DNA
sequencing was further conﬁrmed. Sequencing of the
hemagglutinin and neuraminidase genes revealed that this
strain was closely related to strains from Guangzhou and
Guangdong [3]. Mutations associated with drug resistance were
not found in this patient. Patient subsequently recovered and
was discharged on March 13, and she returned to China on
March 16.
Ebola virus disease (EVD), which ﬁrst appeared in 1976 in
Central Africa, was reported for the ﬁrst time in West African
countries in March 2014. On August 8, WHO declared the
outbreak of a Public Health Emergency of International
Concern. In August 2014, IMR was given the task by the MOH
to be in charge of laboratory diagnosis of EVD for Malaysia [4].
In preparation for a possible surge, IMR started active
surveillance for any importation of EVD suspect cases and
trained the National Public Health Laboratory staff in
management of samples from suspected EVD cases and in
laboratory diagnosis of EVD. Also, as part of preparedness in
dealing with the possibility of EVD outbreak in Malaysia,
IMR organised training for 9 hospital laboratories in working
in the biosafety level2 with the biosafety level3 (BSL3)
practices. The ﬁrst sample for EVD investigation arrived in
IMR on September 3. The sample was inactivated in BSL3
laboratory following that the Ebola virus rRT-PCR test was
performed and sample was found to be negative for Ebola virus.
Since then, 11 more cases have been found negative by both
IMR and National Public Health Laboratory.
The timely laboratory detection for the MOH has ensured
that the above infectious disease outbreaks were effectively
contained to a single case. The quick response and ability toaccurately identify the virus and also to conﬁrm a negative case,
was due to the initiatives of the reference laboratory in the
Virology Unit, IMR which had as early as 2011 proactively set
up laboratory tests for exotic disease surveillance and investi-
gation. As part of the preparedness planning, the unit had taken
steps to upgrade their molecular testing technologies with
various rRT-PCR platforms for different exotic viruses to ensure
high throughput and rapid turn-around time. The laboratory has
the capability to detect rabies, Ebola, Marburg, Rift Valley fever,
St Louis encephalitis, West Nile, Crimean Congo haemorrhagic
fever, Lassa, Yellow fever, Hanta viruses and also Inﬂuenza A
from H1 to H15. The primers and probes database for these
viruses and other emerging viruses are regularly updated and a
collection of synthetic positive controls for use in rRT-PCR were
also prepared. Staff are regularly trained with blinded and coded
controls to increase their competency. The Unit has also put up
an on-call list for Malaysian healthcare practitioners to contact
IMR for any urgent laboratory investigations for such cases.
As part of the national preparedness plan and in an effort to
cope with the surge of laboratory cases during an active
outbreak, inﬂuenza type A, inﬂuenza type B and MERS-CoV
tests were decentralised to all hospitals and public health labo-
ratories with PCR facilities. For Ebola, testing was decentralised
to laboratories with BSL3 facilities only. As an early preparation
for decentralization of the tests to these laboratories, hands-on
training and workshops were conducted to build the capacity
of their laboratory staff on the diagnosis of these viruses. In
order to ensure the quality of tests performed, the IMR has
initiated a quality assurance programme known as the National
External Quality Assessment Scheme for Molecular Detection of
Inﬂuenza Viruses and MERS-CoV; and the programme is car-
ried out twice a year. The objective of the programme is to
assess test performance of the participating laboratories in
detecting Inﬂuenza A & B Viruses and MERS-CoV using mo-
lecular technique.
The WHO Western Paciﬁc Region Ofﬁce together with the
South East Asia Ofﬁce developed an Asia Paciﬁc Strategy for
Emerging Diseases (APSED) – a strategic framework for
countries to build the capacity required under the International
Health Regulations 2005 [5]. The MOH, Malaysia embraced the
vision of APSED and drafted Malaysia's own strategic document
and action plan [6]. Rapid laboratory conﬁrmation of the
aetiological agent is important to implement public health
measures to limit community spread by permitting the timely
isolation of cases and contact tracing. A stewardship role for a
reference laboratory is important to make the APSED plan
workable.
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